

Secure Payments Task Force Payment Lifecycles and Security Profiles

DMF Vote Results Addendum: Vote and Comment Record

Executive Summary

In January 2015, the Federal Reserve published the *Strategies for Improving the U.S. Payment System*, a multi-faceted plan for collaborating with payment system stakeholders to enhance the speed, safety, and efficiency of the U.S. payment system. As a result, the Secure Payments Task Force (SPTF) was established to advise the Federal Reserve on payment security matters, coordinate with the Faster Payments Task Force and determine payment security priorities for future action. The task force has produced the Payment Lifecycles and Security Profiles as one of their key deliverables, and is now being asked to officially approve this deliverable.

The task force vote was conducted from January 11 to January 26 to approve the Payment Lifecycles and Security Profiles. This document (*Vote Results Addendum: Vote and Comment Record*) provides the votes of each Secure Payments Task Force member as well as comments. The *Vote Results*, which can be found in a separate document, includes numerical results of the vote, at both the task force and voting segment level. In accordance with the Decision-Making Framework, these documents will be published on FedPaymentsImprovement.org.

Approval of the Payment Lifecycles and Security Profiles

Approval of the Payment Lifecycles and Security Profiles was achieved in accordance with the Decision-Making Framework, which is applied to task force work products requiring a super majority consensus. Task force members who voted were asked to: (1) "Consent," with an option to provide comments; (2) "Stand Aside," with an option to provide comments; or (3) "Object," with a required declaration of concerns and a proposal for an alternative approach that addresses those concerns. With 63% of task force members participating in the vote, the framework achieved a decisive 90% consent rate as well as the consent of all eight industry segments. (Details can be found in the *Vote Results*.) On February 21, 2018, the Secure Payments Task Force chair recorded the Payment Lifecycles and Security Profiles as approved based on the results of the task force vote.

Payment Lifecycles and Security Profiles Task Force Vote Record

Last Name	First Name	Organization	Voting Segment	Vote*	Comments* (Y/N)
Ahlstrom	Paul	Alta Ventures	Other Stakeholders	Consent	Υ
Alvarez	Troy	Intel Corporation	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Anand	Vijay	Infosys Limited	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Anderson	Adam	Bank of Commerce	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Arminio	Maria	Avenue B Consulting, Inc.	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N
Aubol	Larry	TASCET Inc.	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	Υ
Avena	Sherry	Interactive Financial Services Group, Inc.	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Barouski	William	The Northern Trust Company	Large Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Barrows	Becky	TTCU The Credit Union	Medium Financial Institutions	Consent	Υ
Beckman	Michelle	American Express	Non-Bank Providers	Object	Υ
Benardo	Michael	Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)	Other Stakeholders	Stand aside	N
Bland III	Andrew R.	Harland Clarke	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Boden	Kim	Western Union	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Bradfute	Richard	James Polk Stone Community Bank	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Brungardt	Jill	Commerce Bank	Medium Financial Institutions	Object	Υ
Burchess	Danna	Five Points Bank	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Byrne	Brian	EMVCo	Other Stakeholders	Object	Υ
Callahan	Mary Ann	Paxos Trust Company, LLC	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Campbell	Angela	UMB Bank, N.A.	Medium Financial Institutions	Stand aside	Υ
Canino	Carla	Sunlight Commerce Consulting	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N
Chadwick	Laura	National Restaurant Association	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N
Colvin	Ben	MasterCard	Non-Bank Providers	Object	Υ
Cortedano	Jose	Rosetta Technologies	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Danvers	Christopher	American Airlines Federal Credit Union	Medium Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Dickerson	Kelly	Shore United Bank	Medium Financial Institutions	Consent	Υ
Dooley	Terry	SHAZAM Network	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	Υ
Dresner	Andrew	JPMorgan Chase & Co.	Large Financial Institutions	Consent	Υ
Drohman	Jason	Western State Bank	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Duke	Jim	Woodforest National Bank	Medium Financial Institutions	Stand aside	N
Dulaney	Travis	Push Payments	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Evans	Frazier	Individual Participant	Other Stakeholders	Consent	Υ
Faoro	Dave	Verifone, Inc.	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Farren	Angi	Upper Midwest Automated Clearing House Association (UMACHA)	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N
Fialkov	David	NATSO	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N
Fields	Anne	Crutchfield Corporation	Business End-Users	Consent	N
Fors	Terry	Deluxe Corporation	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Gilbert	Chris	Bankers' Bank of Kansas	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	N

^{*} Comments associated with votes are included in the second section of this report.

Last Name	First Name Organization		Voting Segment	Vote*	Comments* (Y/N)
Gimello	Sarah	Paychex, Inc.	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Giorgio	Tina	ICBA Bancard & TCM Bank	Small Financial Institutions	Stand aside	N
Gobeyn	Gina	Discover Financial Services	Large Financial Institutions	Object	Υ
Guerrier	Amma	Xenith Bank	Medium Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Hallowell	Curtis	Cummins-Allison Corp.	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Hardison	Clint	SunTrust Bank	Large Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Hart	Annmarie	Mag-Tek Inc.	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Hartridge	Andrew	M&T Bank	Large Financial Institutions	Stand aside	N
Helms	Jarrett	The Clearing House (TCH)	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Hennessy	Jane	G2 Web Services	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Hill	Christopher	Bankers' Bank of the West	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	Υ
Holloway	Lauren	PCI Security Standards Council	Other Stakeholders	Object	Υ
Horwedel	Mark	Merchant Advisory Group (MAG)	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N
Hunt	Carrie	National Association of Federally-Insured Credit Unions (NAFCU)	Other Stakeholders	Consent	Υ
Jackson	David	Marketcy	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N
Jenkins	Rue	Costco Wholesale Corporation	Business End-Users	Consent	N
Jensen	Austen	Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA)	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N
Jewell	Linda	Navy Federal Credit Union	Medium Financial Institutions	Object	Υ
Jones	Dewayne	Regions Bank	Large Financial Institutions	Object	Υ
Kendall	Russell	Bank of America	Large Financial Institutions	Consent	N
King	Thaddeus	The Pew Charitable Trusts	Consumer Interest Organizations	Consent	N
Kozlowski III	Theodore	Individual Participant	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N
Kratovil	Jason	Financial Services Roundtable	Other Stakeholders	Object	Υ
Lafferty	Tracy	Alloya Corporate Federal Credit Union	Medium Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Larimer	Jane	NACHA - The Electronic Payments Association	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N
Lees	Sharon	Macon-Atlanta State Bank	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Lindgren	Stephen	Cornhusker Bank	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Love	Paul	CO-OP Financial Services	Non-Bank Providers	Stand aside	N
Lucas	Joyce	Kacil Business & Technology Consulting Firm	Other Stakeholders	Stand aside	Υ
Luhtanen	Reed	Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.	Business End-Users	Consent	Υ
Mares	Brad	Target Corporation	Business End-Users	Consent	N
Martindale	Suzanne	Consumers Union	Consumer Interest Organizations	Consent	Υ
Martz	Stephanie	National Retail Federation	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N
McNaughton	Ryan	North American Banking Company	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Menchion	Cedric	Killeen Independent School District	Government-End User	Consent	N
Merlet	Janet	NEACH	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N
Miller	Mary Ann	Actimize, Inc.	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N

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Mirajkar	Rakesh	Capital One, N.A.	Large Financial Institutions	Stand aside	N	
Montis	Will	AgriBank, FCB	Large Financial Institutions	Consent	N	
Mott	Steve	BetterBuyDesign	Other Stakeholders	Consent	Υ	
Neustifter	Manfred	CFPS Technology Group	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N	
Newton	Sherry	Transwestern	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N	
Noggle	Lance	Credit Union National Association (CUNA)	Other Stakeholders	Object	Υ	
O'Brien	Richard	Payment Pathways, Inc.	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N	
Parks	Justin	BB&T	Large Financial Institutions	Consent	N	
Penny	Bryan	Nordstrom, Inc.	Business End-Users	Consent	N	
Peretti	Brian	Department of the Treasury - OCIP	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N	
Perrelli	Frank	BNY Mellon	Large Financial Institutions	Consent	N	
Petrini	Brooke CGI		Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N	
Piazza	John MB Financial		Medium Financial Institutions	Consent	N	
Picillo	Philip Webster Bank		Medium Financial Institutions	Consent	Υ	
Press	Aaron	LexisNexis Risk Solutions	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N	
Pudmanabhan	Suchitra	CBW Bank	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	N	
Ranzini	Stephen	University Bank	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	N	
Ready	Anna	National Association of Convenience Stores	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N	
Rogers	Paul	United Bankers' Bank	Medium Financial Institutions	Consent	N	
Ruden	Seth	ACI Worldwide	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N	
Russell	Brian	Individual Participant	Other Stakeholders	Consent	Υ	
Sandqvist	Niklas	Aera Payments Identification AS	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	Υ	
Scanio	Salvatore	Ludwig & Robinson PLLC	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N	
Scheidt	Edward	Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X9, Inc.	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N	
Schmidt	Tim	Great Western Bank	Medium Financial Institutions	Consent	N	
Shafquat	Shoaib	QCheque LLC	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	Υ	
Sparrow	Jeff	GeoCommerce Inc	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N	
Srinivasan	Ganesh	Volante Technologies, Inc.	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N	
Stoltz	Rochelle	Coulee Bank	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	N	
Story	Jeff	The Bankers Bank	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	N	
Strayer	Victoria	TSYS	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N	
Tapling	Peter	Individual Participant	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N	
Tassey	Jeffrey	Tassey & Associates	Other Stakeholders	Object	Υ	
Tatge	David	r4 Technologies	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N	
Tonne	Cary	Affinity Plus Federal Credit Union	Medium Financial Institutions	Consent	N	
Tran-Trong	Ку	Visa Inc.	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	Y	
Ulrich	Glen	U.S. Bank	Large Financial Institutions	Consent	N	

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Vanderhoof	Randy	Smart Card Alliance/EMV Migration Forum	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N
Vinogradov	Victor	Western Alliance Bank	Medium Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Volmar	Scott	InterComputer Corporation	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	Υ
Walker	Hannah	Food Marketing Institute	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N
Wallen	Charles	Spectrum	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Weaver	Michelle	Extraco Banks, N.A.	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Welch	Bruce	Gilbarco Inc.	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Whaley	Cary	Independent Community Bankers of American (ICBA)	Other Stakeholders	Consent	Υ
Wilkes	Bradley	WingCash, LLC	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Williams	Christopher	Exponent, Inc.	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N
Williquette	Joel	Capital Credit Union	Medium Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Wyson-Constantine	Heather	American Bankers Association	Other Stakeholders	Object	Υ
Zelazny	Frances	BioCatch	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	N
Zhang	Yuemei	Wells Fargo & Company	Large Financial Institutions	Consent	Υ
Zietlow	Robert	Bankers' Bank	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	N
Zirkle	Amy	Electronic Transactions Association (ETA)	Other Stakeholders	Consent	N

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Payment Lifecycles and Security Profiles Task Force Comment Record

Last Name	First Name	Voting Segment	Comment Type	Comment
Ahlstrom	Paul	Other Stakeholders	Consent	I like the positioning of open standards. I believe the world we are heading into will lean towards adoption of tokenization, user authentication and encryption approach leveraging open standards for security. These open standards could be de jure or de facto as long as they are available and widely accepted.
Aubol	Larry	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	The profile is tightening up. Good work. LA-
Barrows	Becky	Medium Financial Institutions	Consent	While choosing consent, I also understand these are living documents to which changes can be made if and when needed.
				First, we acknowledge the substantial degree of change made to the document since the last vote. Clearly the input from a wide array of stakeholders expressed prior to and during the most recent task force meeting has been both heard and largely incorporated, resulting in a product we believe much more accurately, completely, and objectively portrays the current industry landscape. As such, we have had a strong desire to provide an unqualified "consent" vote of endorsement.
Beckman	Michelle	Non-Bank Providers	Object	However, we remain sufficiently concerned about unchanged language concerning "open standards" and the implications of it to register an object vote. We feel compelled to voice advocacy for approaches that guide consistent, scalable, and interoperable deployment in a global marketplace for many key payment technologies. Explicit use of "open standards" language is potentially exclusionary and subject to misinterpretation. We support decisions to deploy technologies being made based on a pragmatic approach on when suitable for use for relevant use cases, allowing the best tools to combat fraud to come to emerge and grow. Open standards screening criteria is subjective and could inhibit freedom of choice of tools that may be the most effective at achieving fraud reduction.
				Amend "open standards" language that has been the source of much debate from wide array of stakeholders to simply "standards" OR remove such terminology altogether.
Brungardt	Jill	Medium Financial Institutions	Object	As context for my vote, I wish to register that the deployment of technologies like encryption, tokenization, and user authentication should be made on a pragmatic, non-mandated basis. The benefits of these particular technologies are situation-dependent and no single static solution can be generalized to the entire payments system. The knowable security case for these technologies exists independently of standards or any governance structure (or absence of such a structure). In order to avoid confusion between security and non-security governance issues, I would suggest broadening the language around standards to simply read "standards" instead of "open standards" or remove the reference to "standards" entirely. Given that consumers deserve the most responsive security approach, it is important that non-security issues do not become an obstacle to the rapid deployment of needed technologies in their proper contexts.
Byrne	Brian	Other Stakeholders	Object	Unfortunately, the term "open standards" has become a proxy for challenging the governance model of EMVCo. Different stakeholders have different views, on the most effective way to facilitate global reliability in the acceptance of card based payments. The EMVCo position is that the SPTF Payment Lifecycles and Security Profiles are not the appropriate forum to introduce such a politically charged discussion.
				That the "open standards" phrase used multiple times in Section 5 of multiple profiles, be replaced with the phrase "industry standards" or simply the word "standards."
Campbell	Angela	Medium Financial Institutions	Stand aside	As context for my vote, I wish to register that the deployment of technologies like encryption, tokenization, and user authentication should be made on a pragmatic, non-mandated basis. The benefits of these particular technologies are situation-dependent and no single static solution can be generalized to the entire payments system. The knowable security case for these technologies exists independently of standards or any governance structure (or absence of such a structure). In order to avoid confusion between security and non-security governance issues, I would suggest broadening the language around standards to simply read "standards" instead of "open standards" or remove the reference to "standards" entirely. Given that consumers deserve the most responsive security approach, it is important that non-security issues do not become an obstacle to the rapid deployment of needed technologies in their proper contexts.

Last Name	First Name	Voting Segment	Comment Type	Comment
Colvin	Ben	Non-Bank Providers	Object	Mastercard objects to the Payment Lifecycle and Security Profiles because of the continued use of the term "open standards" as it is in section 5 of many of the different profiles. Mastercard believes, based on the dialogue that has occurred in SPTF related forums that the term 'open standards' is vague, not well defined and has a different meaning to the various stakeholders in the payments ecosystem. Therefore the term is subject to broad interpretation by the stakeholders about the most effective way to enable 'greater deployment of tokenization, user authentication and encryption' to enable secure and reliable card payments. Mastercard recommends that the 'open standards' phrase be replaced with the phrase "industry standards" or simply the word "standards" to ensure the most expedient close to this work effort.
Dickerson	Kelly	Medium Financial Institutions	Consent	As context for my vote, I wish to register that the deployment of technologies like encryption, tokenization, and user authentication should be made on a pragmatic, non-mandated basis. The benefits of these particular technologies are situation-dependent and no single static solution can be generalized to the entire payments system. The knowable security case for these technologies exists independently of standards or any governance structure (or absence of such a structure). In order to avoid confusion between security and non-security governance issues, I would suggest broadening the language around standards to simply read "standards" instead of "open standards" or remove the reference to "standards" entirely.
Dooley	Terry	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	A next step to address the risks, gaps, and challenges and to improve security, interoperability, transparency as well as the consumer experience would be for payments to be based on Open and Accredited standards created and managed by recognized Open and Accredited standards organizations like ANSI and ISO instead of proprietary framework bodies like PCI and EMVCo. Great job to the team who spent countless hours on these work products and I congratulate the Federal Reserve for facilitating and bringing the industry together in an incredibly open and transparent process.
Dresner	Andrew	Large Financial Institutions	Consent	While we consent to the overall document, we disagree with the use of the term "Open standards" within the text. We would have agreed with the term "standards", but the current language is not consistent with many of the core standards in use by the industry today and would slow down the adoption of new standards going forward. Further, we would emphasize that this is a document of the Task Force and not the Fed itself and should always be presented that way in public forums.
Evans	Frazier	Other Stakeholders	Consent	I believe there is still work to be done but this is a great foundational document to build from.
Gobeyn	Gina	Large Financial Institutions	Object	Good progress, however remaining stakeholder concerns on items not critical to the intended purpose of the Payment Lifecycle & Security Profiles deliverable remain. The term "open standards" remains in several of the use cases; it term is a point of conflict/concern of stakeholders across the taskforce. The conflict distracts from the intention of the Payment Lifecycle and Security Profiles deliverable and not relevant to its intended purpose. Remove the term "open standards" and replace with the term "standards."
Hill	Christopher	Small Financial Institutions	Consent	I know there is concern among some organizations involved about the phrase "open standards" when it comes to tokenization, user authentication and encryption as well as risk-based cybersecurity. While I think that is a loaded phrase that could be misused, I don't want that to deny moving the entire initiative forward. I do hope the task force / subgroup / steering committee / etc. reopen discussion about this particular point in the Challenges and Improvement Opportunities in all of the Payment Lifecycles and Security Profiles.

Last Name	First Name	Voting Segment	Comment Type	Comment
Holloway	Lauren	Other Stakeholders	Object	We object to the statement in several of the profiles that "Greater deployment of tokenization, user authentication and encryption based on open standards could enhance payment security." Standards development occurs in thousands of individual organizations that vary significantly in many ways as regards their technical processes, costs and requirements of participation, intellectual property regimes and more. PCI SSC is involved in a variety of these standards development organizations, and has evolved its own rules and procedures to best accomplish its important goals in the context of the rapidly evolving threat landscape in which it operates. The challenges presented by this landscape require the ability to address cybersecurity threats quickly, sometimes within confidential settings, when vulnerabilities are identified or new threats emerge. It also requires a degree of coordination of purpose and approach that is seldom possible where standards are developed among multiple "siloed" standards organizations, each of which concerns itself with only one or a few technical areas or business domains. In contrast, the holistic, "end to end" approach adopted by PCI SSC provides a comprehensive approach to payment card security with proven efficacy. While it is true that the process employed by PCI SSC therefore necessarily varies in some respects to those of some other standards development, and that practices vary, both within and across industries. Indeed, while the U.S. government's OMB Circular A-119 does express a preference for the use of "voluntary consensus body" standards in government's often Circular A-119 does express a preference for the use of "voluntary consensus body" standards in government's often Circular A-119 does express a preference for the use of "voluntary consensus body" standards in superior, has been more wiely adopted, or may have any of a long list of other enumerated benefits. In addition, under World Trade Organization rules barring the erection of technical barriers to trade, s
Hunt	Carrie	Other Stakeholders	Consent	I will note that there is still some ambiguity concerning the meaning of open standards in the document, and NAFCU wants to ensure that this ambiguity could never serve as an opportunity to direct criticism at credit unions for failing to use any one particular security method.

Last Name	First Name	Voting Segment	Comment Type	Comment
Jewell	Linda	Medium Financial Institutions	Object	As context for my vote, I wish to register that the deployment of technologies like encryption, tokenization, and user authentication should be made on a pragmatic, non-mandated basis. The benefits of these particular technologies are situation-dependent and no single static solution can be generalized to the entire payments system. The knowable security case for these technologies exists independently of standards or any governance structure (or absence of such a structure). In order to avoid confusion between security and non-security governance issues, I would suggest broadening the language around standards to simply read "standards" instead of "open standards" or remove the reference to "standards" entirely. Given that consumers deserve the most responsive security approach, it is important that non-security issues do not become an obstacle to the rapid deployment of needed technologies in their proper contexts. Thank you
Jones	Dewayne	Large Financial Institutions	Object	As context for my vote, I wish to register that the deployment of technologies like encryption, tokenization, and user authentication should be made on a pragmatic, non-mandated basis. The benefits of these particular technologies are situation-dependent and no single static solution can be generalized to the entire payments system. The knowable security case for these technologies exists independently of standards or any governance structure (or absence of such a structure). In order to avoid confusion between security and non-security governance issues, I would suggest broadening the language around standards to simply read "standards" instead of "open standards" or remove the reference to "standards" entirely. Given that consumers deserve the most responsive security approach, it is important that non-security issues do not become an obstacle to the rapid deployment of needed technologies in their proper contexts.
Kratovil	Jason	Other Stakeholders	Object	While the Payment Lifecycles and Security Profiles have evolved in very significant and positive ways and the Fed team is to be applauded for their efforts I cannot consent to these documents on behalf of my members so long as they contain the unnecessary, superfluous, and blatantly political use of the term "open standards." Were the word "open" dropped from these documents, or replaced by a more accurate term such as "industry," I would be excited to vote to provide my consent to this process. However, the inclusion of the word "open" is an overt attempt by some to bias this collaborative process against certain parties. It is such a shame that, despite such tremendous progress made elsewhere in these documents, that the use of this single word which will be used to politicize this entire effort once it is finalized has been allowed to proceed. From a purely objective standpoint are there lots of "closed" standards out there? Are there many standards-setting bodies that brag about their "closed" standards? If so, I'm not aware of any. So why continue to use the word? Moreover, why continue to use the word without providing a definition of the phrase "open standards?" Given an appropriate definition elsewhere, it's conceivable that "open standards" could be acceptable. Yet despite these recommendations and arguments being made by many participants over the last few months, nothing on this issue has changed. For this reason, and in the best interest of my members, I must object. Remove the word "open" from "open standards." Alternatively, replace with "industry," as in "industry standards."
Lucas	Joyce	Other Stakeholders	Stand aside	At our last DMF vote - I voted positively - read the changes - and don't see any real concerns.

Last Name	First Name	Voting Segment	Comment Type	Comment
Luhtanen	Reed	Business End-Users	Consent	I would like to take this opportunity to praise the Federal Reserve staff, the steering committee, and our colleagues on the task force at large. The publication of this document will truly be a landmark achievement for the industry. The process that was undertaken ensured that every stakeholder who had a viewpoint was afforded ample opportunity to raise that viewpoint and engage in discussion with a cross-section of industry participants. While the document stops short of many recommendations we would make as business end users, I recognize that it is inevitable that any document published by such a group will fail to espouse the views of any particular segment. With that in mind, i consent to the publication of this document and urge the entire task force to continue to travel down the path to a more secure payments system.
Martindale	Suzanne	Consumer Interest Organizations	Consent	Thanks to everyone for their hard work on this crucial foundational document for the Task Force. It will provide substantial value to the payments community and the general public.
Mott	Steve	Other Stakeholders	Consent	This work represents a good start to shedding the light needed to fix what ails the payment system, laying the foundation for understanding the sources of fraud and inefficiency, and setting the stage for the next phase of the Task Force in drilling down to identify and address solutions. Bravo!
Noggle	Lance	Other Stakeholders	Object	We appreciate the hard work by all who have worked on the payment lifecycles and security profiles. We continue to remain concerned by the continued use of "open standards." This takes a step beyond the principles of security that should be part of the profiles. Unfortunately we cannot partially support or partially object, which is why we object so that our concerns with the vote and process are on record. The language should read "standards" instead of "open standards" or remove the reference to "standards" entirely.
Picillo	Philip	Medium Financial Institutions	Consent	As context for my vote, I wish to register that the deployment of technologies like encryption, tokenization, and user authentication should be made on a pragmatic, non-mandated basis. The benefits of these particular technologies are situation-dependent and no single static solution can be generalized to the entire payments system. In fact our industry continues to message around a multi pronged approach related to security. It appears that much discussion has occurred between and among many stakeholders. The issue for some seems to be the use of the word "open" related to standards developed or in use today to achieve a secure, ubiquitous real time payment solution. It is this participants expectation that should the word 'open" be part of the lexicon related to the lifecycle documents it is in no way indicative that the industry will be subject to further regulatory oversight. The knowable security case for these technologies exists independently of standards or any governance structure (or absence of such a structure). In order to avoid confusion between security and non-security governance issues, I would suggest one alternative would be to broaden the language around standards. Given that consumers deserve the most responsive security approach, it is important that non-security issues do not become an obstacle to the rapid deployment of needed technologies in their proper contexts.
Russell	Brian	Other Stakeholders	Consent	The team has worked extremely hard over the past year to assemble this excellent work package. I believe it will be received positively and help the market implement more efficient and effectively security solutions.
Sandqvist	Niklas	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	To us these use cases seems to be a very comprehensive documentation of the different payment methods including security relevant information and risks.
Shafquat	Shoaib	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	Thank you for all your hard work for keeping our payment systems safe

Last Name	First Name	Voting Segment	Comment Type	Comment
Tassey	Jeffrey	Other Stakeholders	Object	Despite all of the work that has occurred, and the desire to "consent", the retention of "open standards" is in my view inconsistent with an educational undertaking focused on security. "Open standards" or even "standards" in my view has become a proxy for a private sector governance process that could lead to a mandate of a particular security technology, and indeed, for example, individual task force participants have commented in favor of such concepts as a "PIN mandate", which in turn is a proxy for other issues that are even less consistent with an educational undertaking focused on security. The decision to apply a technology such as tokenization is made on a situational basis where, for instance, deployment of a static technology is completely inappropriate, and and I do not see how a particular governance structure for a standard has any bearing on security; the security case for a particular technology is completely discernible independent of a standard or governance structure. Simply remove any reference to standards.
Tran-Trong	ку	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	We support the development of the Payment Life Cycle and Security Profiles and commend the Steering Committee members and Fed staff for their hard work in taking into account industry feedback and making significant improvements to the Profiles as they are presented in this DMF vote. To avoid potential confusion that may arise from the current references to "open standards" in the Profile documents and given the immense importance of securing the payment system through greater deployment of layered security including tokenization, encryption, and user authentication generally, we recommend that the language around standards to simply read "standards" rather than "open" standards or any other qualification. At a minimum, we recommend that the final Profiles clarify that the sentence regarding "greater deployment of tokenization, encryption, and user authentication" is not intended to suggest that current industry standards are not "open".
Volmar	Scott	Non-Bank Providers	Consent	I consent to the profiles as profiles. They have been deliberated as thoroughly as possible from a generic point of view, but not with respect to any specific implementation of any payment type. The rubber meets the road when evaluating/upgrading actual implementations and the variables associated with those implementation from end-to-end. End-to-end risk analysis must be done in the implementation/upgrade stage and analyzed in completeness. There are points of vulnerability which the profiles cannot address. The profile is an effective guide as it intended to be. But there are other security and secure messaging criteria to be considered implementation by implementation. I believe a qualified statement to this effect belongs in the publication. I give applause to the PIM and data Protection sub-workgroup and the Security Task Force at large for painstaking job well done.
Whaley	Cary	Other Stakeholders	Consent	ICBA consents to the publishing of The Payment Lifecycles and Security Profiles and expresses appreciation to the Federal Reserve and the Secure Payments Steering Committee for taking the time to consider all feedback and ensure a balanced picture of payments security without taking security principals out of their intended payments context. The Payment Lifecycles and Security Profiles will educate payments stakeholders and provide perspectives related to: the lifecycles of the most common payment types (enrollment, transaction flow and reconciliation); security methods, identity management controls and sensitive data occurring at each step in the payment lifecycles; relevant laws and regulations, and other references, as well as challenges and improvement opportunities related to each payment type. While ICBA consents to the document as a whole, we do express concern of the use of the term "open standards." ICBA regards the term as murky, at best. Standards can be open to the industry, openly owned, or openly maintained. Only the availability of the standard could pertain to security the other two are business issues. Since the document does not define "open standard" in the document, ICBA's consent is based on the term meaning open to the industry.

Last Name	First Name	Voting Segment	Comment Type	Comment
Wyson- Constantine	Heather	Other Stakeholders	Object	Introduction The American Bankers Association is pleased to submit the following comments. Founded in 1875, the American Bankers Association is the united voice of America's hometown bankers—small, regional and large banks that together employ more than 2 million women and men, hold nearly \$17 thillion in assets, safeguard \$15 tillion in deposits and extend more than 39 tillion in locate. America's regulated financial institutions believe strongly that consumers deserve a high level of security in their payment options and therefore invest significant resources in developing, deploying, and improving proactive measures to secure the elements of the payment system under their control. Banks and credit unions comply with robust physicial and data security requirements provided by statute and regulation, and are regularly examined for their compliance. But they go further to protect their communities. Financial institutions strive for excellence by constantly innovating in the face of emerging threats and changing usustomer needs. Advances in tactics and technology mean that, increasingly, attempted francial is intercepted and blocked before it is completed and blosses occur. This constantly-evolving, dynanic landscape is why the financial services industry embraces a forward-boking appreach to payment security sizes. Security professionals at regulated financial institutions work closely with state and federal law enforcement agencies to anticipate threat trends and combat new methods of attack. They collaborate with industry colleagues and in other sectors, in forums south as the Federal Reserve's Secure Payments Task Force. The American Bankers Association fully supports the goals of the Task Force, and along with other financial services trade associations and their immehrer, has contributed of pensional services trade associations and their immehrer, has contributed on the support to the subject matter expertise residing in America's banks. Declaration of Objection Payments are best protected by multiple
Zhang	Yuemei	Large Financial Institutions	Consent	I would like to see our continued effort to improve those profiles, especially, I'd like to focus our effort on the technology or procedural standards, instead of standards related to regulations or rules. Also, we should avoid referring to "open standards" as this is a confusing term.